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Abstract 
An ongoing question is whether private (religious) schools provide better education than public schools. This study re-
addresses this issue, using PISA 2006 and 2009 data for the Netherlands and three different methodologies. Overall, there 
is no consistent pattern. Results based on ordinary least squares and propensity score matching suggest private school 
attendance is positively associated with mathematics achievement, but only for PISA 2006. Instead, the results generated 
by an instrumental variable approach are very unstable. A thorough understanding of selection processes in Dutch 
education, and better data, seem necessary for future empirical work on this matter. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a widespread consensus on the notion that a well-educated labor force is vital for any 
economy. Nations around the world thus seek o ther  ways  to improve their schools as to enhance the 
skills and employability of their youth and/or to reduce inequalities in outcomes. As such, all OECD 
countries invest a substantial proportion (close to 6%) of national resources in education (Hansson and 
Charbonnier, 2010). There is less agreement on how to fund and provide education in the most effective 
way. Literature provides mixed results on the effects of input-based policy measures. In the wake of the 
current global economic crisis, countries face the challenges of making public finances sustainable, while 
also building the foundations for continued long-run economic growth.  
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This situation provides incentives for establishing greater effectiveness and efficiency in schooling. One 
of the questions in this ongoing debate is whether private (religious) schools provide better education than 
public schools. Over the past decades, several policy actions have argued for the promotion of private 
educational systems throughout the world. Some countries make a sharp distinction between the role of the 
public sector as education financier and that as education provider.  
In the Netherlands, (virtually) all education is publicly financed, including the private schools that 
accommodate over two- thirds of all students. A solid body of empirical results on the causal effects of 
private- and public school attendance on student achievement is important for the policy debate on how 
(compulsory) education should be funded and provided. This study re-addresses this issue, using both PISA 





2.1 Ordinary Least Squares: covariate control 
 
The first empirical approach conducted is based on ordinary least squares (OLS). An attempt is being made 
to isolate a potential private school effect; thereby controlling for observed student- and school-level 
background characteristics that are considered to be beyond the control of the school. The objective is that, by 
controlling for observed selection bias, any unobserved selection is adequately dealt with as well. The OLS 
model to predict student achievement is given by: 
 
 




s∑ + γ Privateij + εij
     (1) 
 
where Yij is the achievement score for student i in school j, Xkij a set of m student-level background  
characteristics and Stj a set of s school-level background characteristics, γ the treatment effect of attending a 
private school and an error term εij.  
 
2.2 Instrumental Variable design: exogenous variation in treatment 
 
In order to get estimates based on an instrumental variable approach (IV), which bases the effect of private 
schooling on exogenous variation in treatment generated by the instrument, the identification strategy of 
Patrinos (2011) is replicated. The first stage in the 2SLS is given by: 
  
 




s∑ + δ IVij +υij
     (2) 
 
where Dij is private school attendance, IVij is the student’s school principal response to whether parents’ 
endorsement of the instructional or religious philosophy of the school is taken into consideration at the time of 
admission (IVij = 1 if “yes” and 0 otherwise). As before, Xkij is a set of m student-level background 
characteristics and Stj a set of s school-level background characteristics. The predicted values for private 
school attendance are then used in the second stage: 
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s∑ + γ Dˆij + εij
     (3) 
 
where γ is the 2SLS estimate for the effect of private school attendance on student achievement. 
 
2.3 Propensity Score Matching: matching students on observed characteristics 
 
In an attempt to strictly control for observed selection bias, a propensity score matching (PSM) 
identification strategy is conducted. In the first stage of this estimation strategy, the propensity score of 
attending a private school is predicted for all students along the lines of the matching algorithm suggested by 
Deheja and Wahba (2002). This is done through estimating a logistic regression model. A nearest-neighbor 
strategy, with replacement, is then used to estimate the treatment effect of attending a private school. The 
balance improvements after matching are summarized in Appendix B. As a regression can improve the 
precision of the estimates, a weighted regression using the treatment and matched comparison units is 
estimated, with the comparison units weighted by the number of times they are matched to a treated unit. This 
model can then be presented as: 
 
 
Yij = β0 + βk Xkij +
k=1
m∑ δkSkj +  
k=1
s∑ γTreatedij +  εij
     (4) 
 
where Yij is the achievement score for student i in school j, Xkij a set of m student-level background 
characteristics and Stj a set of s school-level background characteristics, γ the treatment effect of attending a 
private school for the subset of treated students after the matching process has been performed, and an error 
term εij. 
3. Results 
The raw achievement differences between public- and private school students for PISA 2006 and 2009 are 
displayed in Appendix A. For PISA 2006, private school students perform relatively better for mathematics 
(0.09σ), and slightly above public school students for science and reading. However, in PISA 2009, private 
school students appear to perform worse on all three subjects; ranging from approximately 6 points lower 
(approximately 0.06σ) in science to almost 11 points (close to 0.13σ) in reading. It would be naive to attribute 
such differences in achievement to private school attendance, since students across both school types are 
different in some observed characteristics. For example, from the descriptive statistics it also becomes clear 
that private school students, on average, are relatively more often to be found in vocational tracks, in slightly 
lower level program types and in lower grades. Also, household characteristics, as measured by an index for 
economic, social and cultural status (ESCS), are relatively disadvantageous for private school students in 
PISA 2006 and 2009. On the other hand, home educational resources tend to be relatively better for these 
students. In line with existing literature for the Netherlands, private school students are somewhat less likely 
to come from an immigrant background. 
Each of the proposed methodologies aims to account for such important differences across school type, as 
to get insight in a potentially causal relationship between school type and academic achievement. Enabling 
comparisons across methodologies, estimates for the full model specifications as outlined in equations 1-4, 
but for mathematics only, are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Estimates for relative private school effectiveness, using OLS, IV and PSM 

      
 	   	 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics 
              
private 9.26* 18.96 10.26** -0.08 -28.02 2.14 
(4.736) (11.528) (4.421) (4.533) (28.655) (4.229) 
  
individual background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
school background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
Observations 4,487 3,838 4,125 4,173 3,086 3,723 
R-squared 0.61 0.67 0.60 0.61 0.67 0.62 
Adj. R-squared 0.605 0.669 0.595 0.613 0.666 0.616 
Robust clustered standard errors (at school level) in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In general the OLS and PSM results are similar and relatively precise, suggesting a positive effect for 
mathematics in PISA 2006, but no effect for PISA 2009. In contrast, the effect based on the IV approach is 
relatively imprecise, switches sign across both waves of data, and does not give a clear stable indication for a 
private school attendance effect on mathematics achievement. To be precise, it suggests a positive effect for 
PISA 2006, but the opposite for PISA 2009. 
 One way to compare the IV results quantitatively to the OLS and PSM results is to calculate 
Rosenbaum bounds for the weighted differences in means (across treated and control students) obtained after 
the matching procedure for all three subjects. These Rosenbaum bounds estimates are displayed in Table 2. 
  
Table 2. Rosenbaum bounds estimates for PSM results to be compatible with OLS and IV results 
 
  mathematics PISA 2006 mathematics PISA 2009 
Unobserved Bias lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound 
1 5.375 12.424 -6.192 2.570 
1.1 1.246 16.514 -10.905 7.247 
1.2 -2.532 20.252 -15.189 11.607 
1.3 -6.037 23.680 -19.161 15.618 
1.4 -9.269 26.873 -22.785 19.280 
1.5 -12.268 29.833 -26.172 22.707 
1.6 -15.111 32.599 -29.328 25.901 
1.7 -17.760 35.169 -32.285 28.900 
1.8 -20.252 37.623 -35.052 31.704 
1.9 -22.628 39.921 -37.697 34.388 
2 -24.887 42.102 -40.154 36.883 
Note: Alpha is 0.95 for lower- and upper bounds 
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For PISA 2006, the hidden bias factors Γ, necessary to make these weighted differences in means 
compatible with the IV point estimates is 1.3, for mathematics. For PISA 2009, this hidden bias factor Γ, is 
1.6, so somewhat larger. The confidence interval for the effect found by comparing the weighted differences 
in means after propensity score matching would only include the IV estimate if some unobserved variable 
caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between the treatment and comparison groups by those 
factors. A factor of 1.3 would imply matching students with actual treatment probabilities of 0.64 and 0.58, 
for example. Similarly, a hidden bias factor Γ of 1.7 roughly translates to matching two students with similar 
propensity scores whose actual treatment probabilities are 0.66 and 0.55 instead. Tables 2 also shows that no 
hidden bias is "required" for making the OLS results compatible with the weighted differences in means 
estimated using the PSM procedure (i.e. Γ=1.0), suggesting these two methods give similar results across all 
subjects and both waves of data. 
 Given that attending either a vocational or academic school in secondary education will largely be 
determined by the primary school advice (i.e. prior to treatment), this indicator has been included as a 
background control. However, it could be that student mobility patterns for the first years of secondary 
education prior to the PISA survey (i.e. transferring from a vocational to an academic track and vice-versa) 
are structurally different across school types. Therefore, the same analyses, using all three methodologies, are 
performed on both the subset of students attending a vocational school (around 60%) and on the subset of 
students attending an academic school (around 40%). Again, for ease of comparison, the results are presented 
for the effect of private school attendance on mathematics only, although results across subjects are largely 
similar. The OLS and PSM results for the vocational schools are comparable to the results presented earlier, 
whereas the positive effect found for PISA 2006 based on the IV approach seems to be completely driven by 
this subset of schools Table 3. Similarly, the OLS and PSM results for the academic subsample do not differ 
from the overall results, as can be inferred from Table 4. However, the very imprecise, and negative, effect 
found for the overall PISA 2009 data set with the IV approach seems to be accounted for by the academic 
subset of schools (Table 4). Instead, an imprecisely estimated "zero effect" is suggested for the subset of 
vocational schools in PISA 2009 (Table 3). 
  
Table 3. Esitmates for relative private school effectiveness, PISA vocational subsamples 
 
 PISA 2006  vocational subsample PISA 2009  vocational subsample 
OLS IV PSM OLS IV PSM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics 
              
private 6.17 33.25* 10.51 0.48 -1.53 4.22 
(6.769) (17.826) (6.491) (7.434) (25.974) (6.591) 
  
individual background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
school background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
Observations 2,410 1,817 2,260 2,069 1,492 1,908 
R-squared 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.36 0.21 
Adj. R-squared 0.287 0.365 0.258 0.193 0.349 0.202 
Robust clustered standard errors (at school level) in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Esitmates for relative private school effectiveness, PISA academic subsamples 
 
PISA 2006  academic subsample PISA 2009, academic subsample 
OLS IV PSM OLS IV PSM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics Mathematics 
              
private 7.26 -5.67 7.81* 1.52 -182.51 -0.43 
(6.306) (14.349) (4.662) (4.711) (415.347) (4.832) 
  
individual background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
school background controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
Observations 2,077 2,021 1,865 2,104 1,594 1,815 
R-squared 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.21 
Adj. R-squared 0.124 0.255 0.118 0.201 . 0.201 
Robust clustered standard errors (at school level) in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.    Conclusion and discussion 
 
This paper set out to apply three different non-experimental methodologies (i.e. OLS, IV and PSM) to 
Dutch PISA 2006 and 2009 data in an attempt to find a clear effect of private school attendance on student 
achievement in three subjects (i.e. mathematics, reading and science). Overall, the results do not point to a 
consistent effect across both waves of data. OLS and PSM results suggest private school attendance is 
positively associated with mathematics achievement, but only in PISA 2006. Instead, the results generated by 
an instrumental variable approach (IV) are very unstable. Relatively large, but imprecise, positive estimates 
are found for all subjects in PISA 2006, whereas the exact opposite (i.e. a large imprecise, but negative result) 
is found for students in the PISA 2009 data set.  
 A sensitivity analysis based on Rosenbaum bounds points out that the OLS and PSM results are 
comparable to each other, but hard to reconcile with the results generated by the IV approach. Performing the 
same analyses on a subset of students in vocational schools and again on the other group of students attending 
an academic school gives OLS and PSM results similar to those obtained from the data set as a whole. 
Instead, the positive association found for PISA 2006 with the IV approach seems to be completely driven by 
the subset of students in vocational schools, whereas the opposite holds for the IV results for PISA 2009. 
 The policy implications of these findings are particularly relevant for the current debate on public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in education. One of the main arguments in a recent WorldBank report on this 
topic is that private management of public schools tends to be efficient and yields higher test scores than 
public institutions when students reach the end of basic education (Patrinos et al., 2009). The Dutch education 
sector is one of the examples used in that report. However, this conclusion does not seem not be supported by 
the Dutch PISA 2006 and 2009 data. 
While relatively stable and precise PSM estimates are obtained, this approach is not free of threats to 
validity either. The validity of the PSM approach hinges on the assumption that no (non-random) selection on 
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unobserved characteristics is present across school types. The Dutch system of universal school choice is 
particularly subject to risks of unobserved self-selection on behalf of the households. To what extent such 
self-selection (e.g. parental motivation) jeopardizes these results is an issue for further inquiry. Unfortunately, 
parental school choice is largely unobserved in the Dutch PISA data set. 
 Another important limitation is that the PISA data set does not allow distinguishing between 
different types of private schools (e.g. Catholic, Protestant or non-religious). This could explain the 
discrepancy of the results shown here with those found in Levin (2004). Alternatively, it could be that private 
school effects are only to be found in primary education. Another hypothesis is that private school effects 
have disappeared over the last couple of years with the ongoing decentralization of public schools and school 
consolidation processes disproportionately affecting private religious schools (cf. Dronkers, 2004) 
 The school (type) effects estimates are based on 2-3 years of attendance only. Students in the 
Netherlands have generally been exposed to 8 years of primary schooling. However, this remains unobserved, 
and its academic results are not taken account of, in the PISA data. In addition, the findings in this report 
relate to academic achievement only. There are many other relevant school type effects (e.g. graduation rates, 
non-cognitive skills, labor market outcomes, parental satisfaction, segregation and social cohesion). In this 
context, the results presented here should be interpreted alongside research on other dimensions of the Dutch 
education system, such as student segregation (e.g. Ladd et al., 2009). 
 There are several potential explanations for an overall absence of school type effects in the 
Netherlands. The Dutch education system, despite being largely decentralized in terms of management and 
pedagogy, is centrally controlled and monitored. In particular, many of the potential mechanisms for 
increased student achievement (i.e. funding, teacher input, instruction hours and curriculum) are not allowed 
to significantly differ across school types. For example, Zoontjens (2003) describes a converging trend in the 
Dutch education sector over the last few decades by pointing to an ongoing decentralization of public schools, 
to a decrease in religious orientation in private schools, and to the increase in cross-school type mergers; 
making it more difficult to actually distinguish between private- and public schools in the Netherlands. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for PISA 2006 and PISA 2009 variables used in the analyses 
A.1. PISA 2006  
PISA 2006 Public   Private   All   
VARIABLES mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) 
mathematics 525.59 (86.68) 533.11 (85.45) 530.68 (85.91) 
reading 504.92 (90.88) 507.67 (94.54) 506.78 (93.37) 
science 523.79 (95.33) 525.42 (91.77) 524.90 (92.93) 
private 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.68 (0.47) 
age 15.72 (0.29) 15.72 (0.28) 15.72 (0.28) 
female (yes=1) 0.48 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 
students' ESCS-index 0.28 (0.92) 0.24 (0.88) 0.25 (0.89) 
books at home:                                       11-100 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 
                                                             101-500 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 
one or more computer(s) at home (yes=1) 0.99 (0.09) 0.99 (0.09) 0.99 (0.09) 
home educational resources 0.08 (0.88) 0.14 (0.85) 0.12 (0.86) 
home possessions 0.23 (0.89) 0.23 (0.84) 0.23 (0.86) 
Mother's education:                              primary 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 
                                               lower-secondary 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 
                                              upper-secondary 0.39 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 
                                                          university 0.39 (0.49) 0.34 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 
immigrant status (yes=1) 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.32) 
non-western language at home (yes=1) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.22) 
academic track (yes=1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 
Students' grade:                                         9th 0.44 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 
                                                                  10th 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 
                                                                  11th 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.07) 
program type 6.98 (2.97) 6.95 (2.85) 6.96 (2.89) 
ESCS-index of school 0.28 (0.53) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.47) 
proportion immigrants at school 0.15 (0.20) 0.10 (0.14) 0.11 (0.16) 
rural 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 
school can fire teachers 0.98 (0.13) 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.07) 
achievement data used 0.76 (0.43) 0.71 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 
school sets teacher increase 0.65 (0.48) 0.71 (0.45) 0.69 (0.46) 
parents involved in budget 0.15 (0.36) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.32) 
student-teacher ratio 16.25 (3.52) 15.84 (4.67) 15.96 (4.36) 
proportion certified teachers 0.91 (0.21) 0.88 (0.18) 0.89 (0.19) 
weekly mathematics hours (categorical) 2.88 (1.51) 2.87 (1.51) 2.87 (1.51) 
weekly reading hours (categorical) 2.93 (1.29) 2.91 (1.29) 2.92 (1.29) 
weekly science hours (categorical) 2.17 (1.92) 2.17 (1.98) 2.17 (1.96) 
N 1553   3306   4859   
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A.2. PISA 2009 
PISA 2009 Public   Private   All   
VARIABLES mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) 
mathematics 531.36 (88.22) 522.75 (83.75) 525.68 (85.39) 
reading 515.23 (86.99) 504.50 (85.28) 508.14 (86.01) 
science 525.74 (101.37) 519.66 (88.48) 521.72 (93.09) 
private 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.66 (0.47) 
age 15.73 (0.28) 15.72 (0.29) 15.72 (0.29) 
female (yes=1) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
students' ESCS-index 0.32 (0.86) 0.24 (0.85) 0.27 (0.86) 
books at home:                                       11-100 0.45 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 
                                                             101-500 0.39 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 
one or more computer(s) at home (yes=1) 0.98 (0.12) 0.99 (0.08) 0.99 (0.09) 
home educational resources -0.03 (0.89) 0.08 (0.81) 0.04 (0.84) 
home possessions 0.32 (0.81) 0.32 (0.75) 0.32 (0.77) 
Mother's education:                              primary 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 
                                               lower-secondary 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 
                                              upper-secondary 0.41 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 
                                                          university 0.33 (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 
immigrant status (yes=1) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 
non-western language at home (yes=1) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 
single-parent household (yes=1) 0.17 (0.37) 0.14 (0.34) 0.15 (0.35) 
academic track (yes=1) 0.47 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 
Students' grade:                                         9th 0.45 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 
                                                                  10th 0.52 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
                                                                  11th 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 
program type 4.59 (2.34) 4.47 (1.97) 4.51 (2.10) 
ESCS-index of school 0.31 (0.48) 0.24 (0.44) 0.27 (0.45) 
proportion immigrants at school 0.14 (0.18) 0.12 (0.19) 0.13 (0.19) 
rural 0.11 (0.32) 0.22 (0.41) 0.18 (0.39) 
school can fire teachers 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
achievement data used 0.69 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 
school sets teacher increase 0.75 (0.43) 0.74 (0.44) 0.75 (0.44) 
parents involved in budget 0.14 (0.34) 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.28) 
student-teacher ratio 15.56 (3.95) 15.67 (5.28) 15.63 (4.90) 
proportion certified teachers 0.87 (0.20) 0.80 (0.24) 0.82 (0.23) 
weekly mathematics hours (minutes) 166.30 (41.02) 165.93 (41.65) 166.05 (41.44) 
weekly reading hours (minutes) 161.51 (38.43) 162.10 (40.43) 161.91 (39.79) 
weekly science hours (minutes) 223.09 (124.83) 213.98 (122.47) 216.91 (123.29) 
N 1795   2872   4760   
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Appendix B. Balance improvements due to propensity score matching procedure 
PISA 2006 PISA 2009
Mean SD Mean SD
Variable Sample Treated Control p>t Treated Control Treated Control p>t Treated Control
age Unmatched 15.72 15.72 0.74 0.30 0.30 15.70 15.72 0.06 0.30 0.30
Matched 15.72 15.72 0.73 0.30 0.30 15.70 15.70 0.55 0.30 0.30
female (yes=1) Unmatched 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.91 0.50 0.50
Matched 0.49 0.50 0.66 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.24 0.50 0.50
students' ESCS-index Unmatched 0.28 0.38 0.00 0.90 0.90 0.31 0.39 0.00 0.80 0.80
Matched 0.28 0.29 0.96 0.90 0.80 0.31 0.32 0.49 0.80 0.80
books at home Unmatched 1.30 1.35 0.02 0.70 0.70 1.25 1.27 0.26 0.70 0.70
Matched 1.30 1.29 0.58 0.70 0.70 1.25 1.22 0.20 0.70 0.70
one or more computer(s) at home (yes=1) Unmatched 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.10 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.10
Matched 0.99 1.00 0.37 0.10 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.10
home educational resources Unmatched 0.18 0.15 0.33 0.80 0.80 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.80 0.80
Matched 0.18 0.16 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.13 0.14 0.64 0.80 0.80
home possessions Unmatched 0.28 0.32 0.11 0.80 0.90 0.36 0.37 0.50 0.70 0.80
Matched 0.28 0.26 0.56 0.80 0.80 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.70 0.80
mother's education Unmatched 4.19 4.29 0.08 1.60 1.70 4.12 4.22 0.01 1.30 1.30
Matched 4.19 4.21 0.75 1.60 1.70 4.12 4.15 0.43 1.30 1.30
immigrant status (yes=1) Unmatched 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.30 0.30
Matched 0.09 0.08 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.30 0.30
non-western language at home (yes=1) Unmatched 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.20
Matched 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.20 0.20
academic track (yes=1) Unmatched 0.44 0.51 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.06 0.50 0.50
Matched 0.44 0.45 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.80 0.50 0.50
student's grade Unmatched 9.50 9.50 0.83 0.60 0.60 -0.52 -0.46 0.00 0.60 0.60
Matched 9.50 9.48 0.12 0.60 0.60 -0.52 -0.48 0.02 0.60 0.60
program type Unmatched 7.22 7.47 0.01 2.70 2.80 4.86 4.89 0.63 1.90 2.10
Matched 7.22 7.13 0.19 2.70 2.80 4.86 4.81 0.39 1.90 2.10
ESCS-index of school Unmatched 0.28 0.37 0.00 0.40 0.50 0.30 0.38 0.00 0.40 0.40
Matched 0.28 0.32 0.00 0.40 0.50 0.30 0.37 0.00 0.40 0.40
proportion immigrants at school Unmatched 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.20 0.10
Matched 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.20 0.10
rural Unmatched 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.40 0.30
Matched 0.03 0.03 0.81 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.56 0.40 0.40  
